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Non-Technical Summary
The empirical literature documents a substantial and rising amount of labor income risk, in par-
ticular, employment risk. In most countries, the government provides insurance against this type
of risk through the payment of unemployment benefits. Other things being equal, the provision
of unemployment insurance increases the welfare of risk-averse households. However, unemploy-
ment benefits also discourage unemployed households from exerting search effort thereby raising
the overall unemployment rate. When employment drops, so does aggregate output. In designing
the unemployment insurance system, governments therefore have to weigh the insurance benefits
against the costs of distorted incentives.
The latest major labor market reforms in Germany (Hartz Reforms) became effective in 2005
and 2006. The 2005-reform reduced the benefit payments for long-term unemployed households
while the 2006-reform shortened the eligibility period for high benefit payments. Both reforms
aimed at putting more weight on the incentive side of the unemployment benefit system. While
the effect on the employment rate and production is unambiguously positive, it is due to the loss
of insurance a priori not clear, how the new system is valued by the people. The valuation of
these reforms, the so called welfare effect, is the ultimate performance measure of labor market
reforms from the perspective of the society and can only be computed on the theory-based
macroeconomic model.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a tractable macroeconomic model, and to use a
calibrated version of the model to evaluate the quantitative effects of the Hartz Reforms on
unemployment, growth, and welfare. We find that first, the 2005-reform had ceteris paribus large
employment effects: the equilibrium unemployment rate has been reduced by approximately
1.1 percentage points from 7.5 to 6.4 percent. Second, the drop in unemployment has led to
substantial output gains. Third, employed and short-term unemployed households experienced
a significant welfare gain, that is, the positive incentive effect dominates the negative insurance
effect. However, the long-term unemployed have lost in welfare terms. Fourth, the effects of the
2006-reform are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively much smaller. Finally, a further decrease
in the benefit rate leads only to small additional welfare gains.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die empirische Literatur dokumentiert ein beachtliches Maß an Arbeitseinkommensrisiken, ins-
besondere verursacht durch das Risiko arbeitslos zu werden. Die meisten Länder stellen eine Ver-
sicherung gegen diese Einkommensrisiken in Form von Arbeitslosenunterstützung zur Verfügung
was, ceteris paribus, die Wohlfahrt risiko-averser Haushalte erhöht. Die Zahlung von Arbeitslo-
sengeld entmutigt jedoch arbeitslose Haushalte, Suchanstrengungen zu unternehmen, sodass die
Arbeitslosenquote steigt und die Produktionsleistung abnimmt. Bei der Wahl des Arbeitslosen-
versicherungssystems müssen die Regierungen daher die Wohlfahrtsgewinne einer Versicherung
gegen die Wohlfahrtsverluste einer falschen Anreizsetzung abwägen.
Die jüngsten großen Arbeitsmarktreformen in Deutschland (Hartz Reformen) traten 2005 und
2006 in Kraft. Mit der Reform von 2005 wurden die Zahlungen an Langzeitarbeitslose drastisch
reduziert, wohingegen die Reform aus dem Jahr 2006 die Bezugsdauer von Arbeitslosengeld I
verkürzte. Beide Reformen zielten darauf ab, verstärkt Suchanreize zu schaffen. Während die
Auswirkungen dieser Reformen auf die Beschäftigung und Produktionsleistung zweifellos positiv
sind, ist es aufgrund des verlorenen Versicherungsschutzes a priori nicht klar, wie das neue
Versicherungssystem von den Haushalten bewertet wird. Die Bewertung dieser Reformen, die
sogenannten Wohlfahrtseffekte, ist das geeignete Erfolgsmaß aus Sicht der Gesellschaft und kann
nur auf Basis eines theoretischen makroökonomischen Modells ermittelt werden.
Ziel dieses Papiers ist es, ein makroökonomisches Modell zu entwickeln, es zu kalibrieren und
die quantitativen Effekte der Hartz Reformen auf Arbeitslosigkeit, Wachstum, und Wohlfahrt zu
evaluieren. Unsere Ergebnisse sind wie folgt: Erstens, die Reform von 2005 hat, ceteris paribus,
große Beschäftigungseffekte. Die Arbeitslosenquote sinkt um etwa 1,1 Prozentpunkte von 7,5
v.H. auf 6,4 v.H. Dies führt zweitens zu einem beachtlichen Anstieg der Produktionsleistung.
Drittens, sowohl Beschäftigte als auch Kurzzeitarbeitslose profitieren von den Reformen und
realisieren signifikante Wohlfahrtsgewinne. Demzufolge dominiert für diese Gruppe der positi-
ve Anreizeffekt den Verlust an Versicherung. Viertens, die Effekte der Reform von 2006 sind
qualitativ vergleichbar, quantitativ jedoch substanziell geringer. Abschließend führt eine weitere
Reduktion des Arbeitslosengelds II lediglich zu geringen zusätzlichen Wohlfahrtsgewinnen.
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1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that individual households face a substantial amount of labor
income risk.1 In particular, employed workers face the risk of becoming unemployed. In most
countries, the government provides insurance against this type of risk through the payment
of unemployment benefits. Other things being equal, the provision of unemployment insurance
increases the welfare of risk-averse households. However, unemployment benefits also discourage
unemployed households from exerting search effort thereby raising the overall unemployment
rate. When employment drops, so does aggregate output. In designing the unemployment
insurance system, governments therefore have to weigh the insurance benefits against the costs
of distorted incentives.2
Although the incentive-insurance tradeoff is already present in a simple one-tiered unemploy-
ment benefit system, governments often run multi-tiered unemployment systems with falling
benefits schedules in order to deal with the incentive-insurance tradeoff more efficiently.3 In
2005 and 2006, the German government implemented two major labor market reforms, the so
called Hartz Reforms, in order to establish a more pronounced two-tiered unemployment insur-
ance system to fight the steadily increasing unemployment rate in Germany. The 2005-reform
reduced the benefit payments in the second tier, whereas the 2006-reform implemented a sharp
reduction in the length of the eligibility period for high benefit payments in the first tier. Both
reforms put more emphasis on the incentive effect of the unemployment system. Obviously, such
reforms tend to reduce the unemployment rate, but the welfare effect is, due to the above men-
tioned tradeoff, ambiguous. In this paper, we develop a tractable macroeconomic model, and
use a calibrated version of the model to evaluate the quantitative effects of the Hartz Reforms
on unemployment, growth, and welfare.
1Using individual data on labor income dynamics, estimates for the standard deviation of labor income range
from 0.15 in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) over 0.19 in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) up to 0.25 in
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004). Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) focus on the specific
issue of labor income dynamics after job displacement and find that long run earnings are on average 25 percent
below the pre-displacement rate for long-tenured workers. For a review of the job displacement literature, see
Kletzer (1998).
2This tradeoff is well known in the literature, e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Lentz (2009).
3Much of the theoretical literature on optimal unemployment insurance, e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979) and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), supports the idea that falling benefit schedules are optimal. However, recently
Shimer and Werning (2007, 2008) challenge this result.
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Our model combines the incomplete markets model developed in Krebs (2003, 2006)4
with the labor market search model introduced by Benhabib and Bull (1983). As in Krebs
(2003, 2006), there are a large number of risk-averse households who invest in risk-free physical
capital and risky human capital. Investment in human capital is risky due to wage risk and
employment risk. Following Benhabib and Bull (1983), unemployed households choose their
search effort that determines their re-employment probability in the subsequent period. There
is a government that provides unemployment insurance and finances these transfer payments
through a consumption tax. Our main theoretical contribution is a tractability result: the
equilibrium allocation can be found without knowledge of the underlying wealth distribution,
which facilitates the computation of equilibria substantially.
Using our theoretical characterization result, we proceed with the quantitative evaluation of
the labor market reforms in Germany. More specifically, we calibrate the model to match the pre-
2005 German data, and then obtain the quantitative effects of the recent labor market reforms
through model simulation. Our main results are as follows. First, the 2005-reform had large
employment effects: the equilibrium unemployment rate has been reduced by approximately
1.1 percentage points from 7.5 to 6.4 percent. Second, the drop in unemployment has led to
substantial output gains. Third, employed and short-term unemployed households experienced
a significant welfare gain, that is, the positive incentive effect dominates the negative insurance
effect. However, the long-term unemployed have lost in welfare terms. The effects of the 2006-
reform are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively much smaller.5 Finally, we show that the
social welfare maximizing replacement rate is lower than the current (post-reform) replacement
rate in Germany. However, implementing the optimal unemployment benefit system generates
only small welfare gains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a short discussion of the related literature
in section 2, we develop the economic model in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the construction
of a competitive equilibrium. In section 5, we calibrate the model to match stylized facts of the
4On the one hand, this model builds on the extensive literature of human capital based endogenous growth
models, e.g. Lucas (1988) and Jones and Manuelli (1990), among many others and, on the other hand, Krebs
(2003, 2006) relates to the macroeconomic incomplete markets literature, e.g. I˙mrohorogˇlu (1992), Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994).
5In other words, the change in the eligibility period implemented in 2006 had only small effects on re-
employment probabilities. This result is consistent with the findings of recent empirical studies (see Fitzen-
berger and Wilke (2010) for Germany).
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German economy and simulate the respective employment, growth, and welfare effects of the
recent labor market reforms. Furthermore, we investigate the robustness of our results with
respect to the critical model parameters. Finally, section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Related Literature
In order to model labor markets explicitly, the literature suggests two approaches: the search
theoretic approach and the matching function approach. The search theoretic approach assumes
that households either receive wage offers that are randomly drawn from a pre-specified distri-
bution, e.g. McCall (1970), Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(1998), or that households endogenously decide on their search effort which then determines
their re-employment probability in the subsequent period, e.g. Benhabib and Bull (1983) and
Lentz (2009). Our paper follows in the tradition of the search literature and is most closely
related to Lentz (2009), who extends Aiyagari (1994) by allowing individual households
to choose their search effort. However, in contrast to Lentz (2009), we consider a tractable
framework that allows us to find (almost) closed-form solutions. Moreover, we take a general
equilibrium perspective and also analyze the long-run growth effects of labor market reforms.
The matching function approach, based on Phelps (1968) and in particular Pissarides
(1979), has the advantage of providing a detailed analysis of the ”demand side” of the labor
market.6 Like the search theoretic approach, these models are often based on risk neutrality
such that the insurance effect of unemployment benefit payments cannot be analyzed. How-
ever, work by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999,2000) has explicitly dealt with risk aversion in
a matching model and shown that unemployment insurance can lead to productivity/output
gains. More recently, several papers have integrated the incomplete-market paradigm with the
matching function approach (Costain and Reiter (2005), Nakajima (2008), and Krusell,
Mukoyama and S¸ahin (2009)) and addressed various economic issues, but none of these pa-
pers has developed a tractable framework for policy analysis. Put differently, the complicated
ex-post heterogeneity of households forces the authors to use time-consuming numerical methods
in order to simulate the equilibria of the economy.7
6For a detailed overview of the matching model approach, see Pissarides (2000).
7Costain and Reiter (2005) and Nakajima (2008) focus on the insurance effect of unemployment benefit
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Our paper also relates to the extensive literature of optimal unemployment insurance that has
explicitly addressed the tradeoff between insurance and incentives in an asymmetric information
framework.(Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)). Papers in
this literature have usually not modelled the consumption-saving choice of individual households,
but in a series of papers Shimer and Werning (2007, 2008) have been able to characterize
analytically the optimal unemployment benefit system using a CARA-utility specification and
a partial equilibrium setting.
Finally, there is a large empirical literature on policy reform evaluation that analyzes the
effect of various labor market reforms on the unemployed using micro-level data (see Franz
(2009) and our discussion in section 5.1 for a survey). In a certain sense, papers in this liter-
ature also deal with the interaction of labor market reform and labor market risk (long-term
consequences of unemployment). However, work in this literature usually does not take into
account any effect of labor market reform on labor demand and wages, something that is ar-
guably of first-order importance when the labor market reform affects a large number of workers
(macroeconomic analysis). By contrast, some of the work in the applied general equilibrium lit-
erature (see, for example, Bo¨hringer, Boeters, and Feil (2005) and Immervoll, Kleven,
Kreiner, and Saez (2007)) explicitly deals with such labor market effects of policy reform,
and some interesting applications of this approach to Germany have been done in Franz,
Gu¨rtzgen, Schubert, and Clauss (2007). However, this work has neither taken into ac-
count income risk nor considered the interaction of labor, capital, and goods markets, two issues
that will take center stage in our analysis.
3 The Economy
3.1 Households
Consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, search model of the labor market with one non-
perishable all-purpose good that can be either consumed or invested. There is a continuum
payments, but in the absence of endogenous search effort choices in their models, the provision of more unem-
ployment insurance does not discourage households from search. Put differently, in designing the unemployment
insurance system, the government in their models does not face the tradeoff between offering insurance, on one
side, and providing incentives, on the other. Launov and Wa¨lde (2010) also present a tractable macro model
with income risk and search/matching, but they do not allow workers to save.
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of ex-ante identical, infinitely-lived households with unit mass. Let S = S1 × S2 denote the
space of stochastic states, where s1it ∈ S1 is the current employment state of household i, and
s2it ∈ S2 denotes an i.i.d. depreciation shock to human capital.
Preferences are time-separable and each household receives utility from consumption cit and
disutility from search effort lit. By choosing the search intensity, unemployed agents directly
determine their next-period re-employment probability. The one-period utility function is sep-
arable in consumption and search. Specifically, assume
u(cit, lit) = log cit − v(lit)− 1s1it=u ω
where v(lit) denotes the disutility from search, satisfying v(0) = 0 and v′(lit) > 0, and ω is the
disutility of being unemployed. The indicator function 1x is one when statement x is true and
zero otherwise. Future utility is discounted by the time discount factor β.
Let kit and hit denote the stocks of physical and human capital held by household i. Em-
ployed households receive capital and labor income, rktkit and rhthit, with rkt and rht denoting
the (gross) return to physical and human capital, respectively. We assume that the income net
of depreciation of unemployed households is proportional to total asset holdings. Specifically,
income is given by bqt (kit + hit), where benefit entitlements can be either high, q = h , or low,
q = l . This assumption guarantees that the unemployed will not shift resources from physical
to human capital as a response to a change of the benefit rate so that output effects that are
solely based on the unemployed’s shift from unproductive human capital to productive physical
capital are excluded. Furthermore, as we will show, every household chooses the same portfolio
of physical and human capital in equilibrium. This excludes substantial negative human capital
investment and thus allows a straightforward interpretation of the benefit rate bqt as unemploy-
ment benefit.8 The households use their net income and their current wealth position to buy
consumption, which is taxed at rate τct, and next period physical and human capital stock.
8There is also a different interpretation of the assumption that income of unemployed households is given by
bqt (kit + hit): The government pays unemployment benefits b˜
q
t hit and seizes a fraction ρ
q
t of the unemployed’s
physical capital income and uses this revenue as an additional source to finance the unemployment benefit net
depreciation. The unemployed’s capital income is thus taken into account when determining the unemployment
compensation. Total income, net of depreciation, of the unemployed is given by ((1 − ρqt )rkt − δk) kit + (b˜qt −
δh(s2it)) hit. For simplicity, we assume that the government sets b˜
q
t and ρ
q
t such that b˜
q
t−δh(s2it) = (1−ρqt )rkt−δk
and define bqt = b˜
q
t − δh(s2it). The unemployed’s income thus simplifies to bqt (kit + hit).
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Each household i chooses a complete contingent plan {cit, ki,t+1, hi,t+1, lit}∞t=0 in order to
maximize its lifetime utility. Specifically, the optimization problem reads
max
{cit,ki,t+1,hi,t+1,lit}∞t=0
{
U = ES
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt (log cit − v(lit)− 1s1it=u ω)
]}
subject to
(1 + τct) cit + ki,t+1 + hi,t+1 =

(1 + rkt − δk) kit + (1 + rht − δh(s2it)) hit, for s1it = e
(1 + bqt ) (kit + hit), otherwise, q ∈ {h , l }
ki,t+1 ≥ 0
hi,t+1 ≥ 0
where δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital and δh(s2it) denotes the stochastic deprecia-
tion rate on human capital. For convenience, the subscript of the expectation operator indicates
the space with respect to which we take the expectation.
We now discuss the space of stochastic states S (in contrast to the individual physical and
human capital holdings {kit, hit} ∈ R2+ that can be directly determined by households in the
previous period) and the underlying state transition probabilities in more detail. Households are
either employed, s1it = e, or unemployed. Unemployed agents are, on the one hand, either good
or bad job seekers {g , b}, and, on the other hand, either entitled to high or low unemployment
benefits {h , l }. Hence, we have to distinguish between four different unemployment states:
households with good search skills that are entitled to high or low unemployment benefits,
s1it = ugh and s1it = ugl , and households with bad job search skills who can as well be entitled
to either high or low unemployment benefits, s1it = ubh and s1it = ubl . Taken together, the total
space of employment states is given by S1 = {e, ugh , ugl , ubh , ubl }.
The employment state transition is as follows: With probability σx, employed agents lose
their job, they become unemployed and are initially both, eligible for high unemployment benefit
and good job seekers. Unemployed agents exert search effort lit and they find a new job in t+ 1
with probability pij(lit), for j ∈ {g , b}. By definition, bad job seekers that exert the same search
effort as the good ones will nevertheless have a lower probability of re-employment. If, job search
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is not successful, they will lose, if it has not already happened before, their entitlement to high
benefits with probability σbt and their good search skills with exogenously given probability σs.9
Following Shimer and Werning (2006), we interpret the shock to the search technology as
depreciation of search skills. For example, search skills depreciate when households have finished
searching for a job in the easily accessible proximity of their own social network and now have
to consider jobs outside their network. Note that while households take σbt as exogenous to
their optimization problem, the government chooses σbt as part of its labor market policy. This
specification of the state transition process implies that the longer the unemployment spell, the
higher the probability that households have lost their entitlement to high benefit payments and
the higher the probability that households have become bad job seekers.
In addition to the employment state, there is a general independent and identical distributed
depreciation shock s2it ∈ S2 on human capital. This shock is used to capture earning volatility
due to e.g. promotion or changes in the working conditions. Clearly, this shock only applies to
employed households. In contrast to the employment shock, this depreciation shock constitutes a
permanent income shock. With δ¯h denoting the deterministic part of human capital depreciation,
the total depreciation rate of human capital reads
δh(s2it) = δ¯h + 1s1it=e s2it
Clearly, only the current employment state has predictive power for the state in the next period:
pi(si,t+1 | sit) = pi(si,t+1 | s1it).
3.2 Production
The production sector consists of a continuum of identical firms with neoclassical production
function that uses physical and human capital to produce the all-purpose good that can be
either consumed or invested. The production sector is competitive and can be represented by
an aggregate firm whose profit function reads
Π(Kt, Het ) = F (Kt, H
e
t )− rkt Kt − rht Het
9The detailed employment state transition matrix is deferred to the appendix.
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Kt denotes the aggregate amount of physical capital in the economy and Het is the aggregate
amount of human capital used in the production sector.
3.3 Government
The government pays out unemployment benefits EI [bqt (kit + hit) | s1it = uq], collects con-
sumption taxes, τctEI [cit], and seizes the unemployed’s capital income, rktEI [kit | s1it = uq] for
q ∈ {g , b} × {h , l }. We assume that the government runs a balanced budget in every period.
Thus, the government’s budget constraint reads
τct EI [cit] + rkt EI [kit | s1it = uq] = EI [bqt (kit + hit) | s1it = uq]
In addition to the consumption tax {τct}∞t=0 and the benefit rates {bht , blt}∞t=0, the government
also chooses the expected entitlement period to high benefit payments via {σbt}∞t=0, which enters
the government’s budget constraint through the expectation operator. From now on, we restrict
to stationary labor market policies in the sense that {bht , blt , σbt}∞t=0 = (bh , bl , σb).
4 Equilibrium
In order to construct the equilibrium, we follow Krebs (2003) and transform the optimization
problem into a portfolio choice problem. Define total wealth wit ≡ kit + hit and the portfolio
share of physical capital θit ≡ kitkit+hit . Equipped with these definitions, the household’s budget
constraint and the law of motion for physical and human capital simplifies to
wi,t+1 =

[
1 + θit (rkt − δk) + (1− θit) (rht − δh(s2it))
]
wit − (1 + τct) cit for s1it = e[
1 + bq
]
wit − (1 + τct) cit otherwise, q ∈ {h , l }
The terms in square brackets denote the return to total wealth that we conveniently define
as [1 + r(θit, sit; rkt, rht)]. For employed agents, this return is the portfolio weighted net
return to physical and human capital. In contrast, unemployed agents just receive an, at least
for the household perspective, exogenous return bq, q ∈ {h , l }. Clearly, the return to wealth
for the employed households depends on the individual portfolio choice, whereas the return for
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unemployed agents does not. With these definitions, the household’s budget constraint simplifies
further to
wi,t+1 =
[
1 + r(θit, sit; rkt, rht)
]
wit − (1 + τct) cit (1)
Instead of {cit, xkit, xhit, lit}∞t=0, households now directly choose {cit, θi,t+1, wi,t+1, lit}∞t=0
subject to the flow budget constraint (1). A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium for Given Labor Market Policy).
A competitive equilibrium for given labor market policy (bh , bl , σb) is
1. a sequence {Kt, Het }∞t=0 that maximizes the firm’s profit for a given sequence of factor
prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0;
2. a sequence {cit, θi,t+1, wi,t+1, lit}∞t=0 that solves agent i’s maximization problem for a given
sequence of factor prices {rkt, rht}∞t=0, idiosyncratic shocks {sit}∞t=0 and consumption tax
rates {τct}∞t=0;
3. a sequence {rkt, rht}∞t=0 that satisfies market clearing on the input factor market, EI [kit] =
Kt and EI [hit | s1it = e] = Het ; and
4. a sequence of consumption tax rates that satisfies the balanced budget constraint of the
government {τct}∞t=0.
From now on, we focus on a stationary equilibrium as defined in the next proposition:
Definition 2 (Stationary Equilibrium).
A competitive equilibrium for given labor market policy is stationary if
1. the returns to physical and human capital are stationary, rkt = rk and rht = rh,
2. the tax policy is stationary, τct = τc, and
3. the flow into the different employment states is equal to the flow out of them.
Let us start with the firm’s optimization problem. Due to competitive markets, the usual
marginal product conditions for profit maximization apply. Define the aggregate capital-to-labor
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ratio that is used in production k˜t = KtHet and define the production technology in intensive form
f(k˜t) = F (k˜t, 1). The conditions for profit maximization in the stationary equilibrium then read
rk = f ′(k˜t) (2)
rh = f(k˜t)− k˜t f ′(k˜t) (3)
Stationarity of the factor prices immediately reveals k˜t = k˜. Thus, the total investment return
can be more compactly written as r(θit, sit; rk, rh) = r(θit, sit; k˜).
We now consider the maximization problem of the households. The Bellman equation asso-
ciated with the household’s optimization problem is
V (θit, wit, sit) = max
cit,θi,t+1,wi,t+1,lit
{
log cit − v(lit)− 1s1it=u ω + β ES
[
V (θi,t+1, wi,t+1, si,t+1
]}
(4)
subject to the flow budget constraint (1). The first-order conditions with respect to wi,t+1, θi,t+1
and lit are
1
cit
= β ES
[
1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1; k˜)
ci,t+1
]
(5)
0 = ES
[
(rk − δk)− (rh − δh(s2i,t+1))
ci,t+1
]
(6)
v′(lit) = β pi′(lit) ES2
[
V (θi,t+1, wi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = e, s2i,t+1)−∑
q∈{g ,b}×{h,l }
pi(s1i,t+1 = uq | s1it) V (θi,t+1, wi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = uq, s2i,t+1)
]
(7)
The Euler equation (5) has the usual interpretation that the household’s utility loss today
of investing one more unit of the consumption good is equal to the utility gain tomorrow of
doing so. The intra-temporal first-order condition (6) states that the household must be in-
different between investing one more unit into physical capital and one more unit into human
capital. Finally, equation (7) requires that the utility loss today of searching one more unit is
equal to the expected utility gain tomorrow of doing so. Any plan {ct, θt+1, wt+1, lt}∞t=0 that
solves the system of first-order conditions equations (5) to (7), the budget constraint (1) and
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the corresponding transversality condition, is a solution to the household’s constrained utility
maximization problem.10 It is easy to verify that the consumption and saving functions
cit =
1− β
1 + τc
(1 + r(θit, sit; k˜)) wit (8)
wi,t+1 = β (1 + r(θit, sit; k˜)) wit (9)
jointly solve the budget constraint (1) and the Euler equation (5). Using these policy functions
with the method of guess and verify, we can show that
Proposition 1. The value function V (θit, wit, sit) that solves the respective Bellman equation
is given by
V (θit, wit, sit) =
1
1− β log[(1 + r(θit, sit; k˜)) wit] +B(s1it) (10)
where B(s1it) solves the Bellman equation in intensive form
B(s1it) = max
θi,t+1,lit
{
log
1− β
1 + τc
+
β
1− β log β − v(lit)− 1s1it=u ω
β ES
[
1
1− β log(1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1; k˜)) +B(s1i,t+1)
]}
(11)
Proof. See appendix.
Using the consumption policy (8), the first-order conditions with respect to θi,t+1 simplify
to
0 = ES2
[
(rk − δk)− (rh − δh(s2i,t+1))
1 + r(θi,t+1, si,t+1; k˜)
]
(12)
Note that since the return to wealth for unemployed households does not depend on their
individual portfolio composition, the first-order condition with respect to the portfolio choice,
equation (12), is independent of the transition probabilities and thus, independent of the current
employment state s1it and the search effort lit. Moreover, this condition is also independent of
10In proposition 1, we solve for the value function that is associated with the plan {cit, wi,t+1, θit, lit}∞t=0.
The value function is finite and thus, the transversality condition holds.
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the current portfolio share and the household’s current wealth, leading to the conclusion that
every agent chooses the same portfolio, independent of his individual shock history and wealth.
This clearly defines a policy function θi,t+1 = θ(k˜).
The consumption policy (8) and the Bellman equation in intensive form (16) help to trans-
form the first-order condition with respect to the search effort decision into
v′(lit)
β pi′(lit)
= ES2
[ (
log(1 + r(θi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = e, k˜))
1− β +B(s1i,t+1 = e)
)
−
∑
q∈{g ,b}×{h,l }
pi(s1i,t+1 = uq|s1it)
(
log(1 + r(θi,t+1, s1i,t+1 = uq, k˜))
1− β +B(s1i,t+1 = u
q)
)]
(13)
Observe that this condition is independent of wealth, the current portfolio and the current
realization of the i.i.d. depreciation shock s2it. Thus, conditional on the employment status, s1it,
every household chooses the same search intensity. This defines a function lit = l(s1it = uq; k˜),
for q = {n , s} × {h , l }. Our result is closely related to Shimer and Werning (2008), who
combine an Aiyagari (1994) model with McCall’s (1970) search model of the labor market.
Under CARA-preferences, they show that the choice of the reservation wage (which is equivalent
to the search effort choice in our model) is wealth-independent with strong implications for the
optimal unemployment benefit scheme. The wealth independence in our model, however, is
based on the combination of more general homothetic preferences and disposable income which
is linear homogenous in the agent’s asset holdings. Market clearing on the input factor market
requires that the households’ supply of physical and human capital is consistent with the firm’s
demand for the two input factors. Thus, market clearing satisfies
k˜ =
EI [(1− θ(s1it; k˜)) wit | s1it = e]
EI [θ(s1it; k˜) wit]
(14)
Although in equilibrium aggregate wealth grows infinitely at a constant rate, the wealth of
type s1t households relative to aggregate wealth is constant. Hence, as will be shown in the
appendix, the market clearing condition (14) depends on the wealth ratios but is independent
of the absolute wealth level.
Finally, using the household’s policy functions and market clearing, it is easy to verify that
the government’s budget constraint is independent of the absolute wealth level. Moreover, since
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the policy functions for saving, portfolio choices and search decisions, as well as the market
clearing condition, are independent of the consumption tax rate, it is trivial to choose the
consumption tax rate τc such that the government budget is satisfied. In particular, the choice
of the consumption tax rate does not distort the equilibrium allocations.
Summing up:
Proposition 2. A stationary competitive equilibrium for given labor market policy, (φh , φl , σb),
is characterized by
1. The firms’ problem satisfies the usual marginal product conditions, equations (2) and (3).
2. The households’ consumption and saving policies are linear homogenous in wealth and given
by equations (8) and (9). Conditional on the employment state, every agent chooses the
same wealth independent portfolio and search effort decision. In particular, the portfolio
choice and search effort decision jointly solve equations (12) and (13).
3. Market clearing satisfies (14) and is independent of the absolute wealth level in the econ-
omy.
4. The consumption tax rate does not distort the above characterized equilibrium and solves
the government’s budget constraint.
Observe that despite the ex-post heterogeneity, which makes solutions to dynamic general
equilibrium models very complicated and time-consuming, we found a very simple solution
within our framework.
5 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate our model economy such that the equilibrium is consistent with quarterly German
data of the pre-reform period. The pre-2005 system was characterized by a rather long period of
Unemployment Benefit entitlements and an essentially unlimited means-tested Unemployment
Assistance after the eligibility to Unemployment Benefit entitlements expired. Unemployment
Benefit was between 60 and 67 percent of the previous net income whereas Unemployment
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Table 1: Calibration - Exogenous Parameters
parameter description value
preferences
A parameter of disutility of search 25
production
α capital share 0.3600
depreciation and depreciation shocks
δk depreciation rate: physical capital 0.0150
δh depreciation rate: human capital if employed 0.0150
µs2t expectation of iid shock 0
σs2t standard deviation of iid shock 0.1500
labor market and transition rates
bh unemployment benefit rate: high entitlement 0.6900
bl unemployment benefit rate: low entitlement 0.6900
σx job separation probability 0.0300
σb probability of loosing high benefit 0.1554
σs arrival rate of search technology shock 0.2500
Assistance lay between 53 and 57 percent of previous net income.11 If benefit payments were
below the minimum level of subsistency, Social Assistance was used to meet the additional need.
Taking this into account, the OECD (2006) calculates effective average net replacement rates
of about 69 percent for both, Unemployment Benefit and Unemployment Assistance. Hence,
the two-tiered unemployment insurance system was effectively a one-tiered system. Based on
Schmitz and Steiner (2007), we calculate an average eligibility period for high benefit pay-
ments of 19.3 months which translates into σb = 0.1554.12 This accomplishes the calibration of
the government’s pre-reform policy parameters.
Having already calibrated σb, we now focus on the determination of the remaining state
transition rates: Since our setup abstracts from non-participation in the labor market, we have
11See for example Schmitz and Steiner (2007).
12In particular, we assume a uniform distribution of households aged between 25 and 64 years and calculate
the average (maximal) entitlement period for this age group.
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to adjust the employment-to-unemployment flows by the employment-to-non-participation flows.
However, the employment-to-non-participation flows also include old households who decide to
retire early, young households who return to school in order to accomplish their formal education
and women who decide to take a maternity leave. These cases cannot be counted as job loss in
a narrow sense, and if we would include them, our job loss rate would be upward biased. To
avoid these issues, we only take the transition rates from employment to unemployment and
from employment to non-participation of 25 to 55 year old males as the job loss rate. Using
the calculations by Bachmann (2005) both rates add up to approximately one percent per
month which yields σx = 0.03 per quarter. Jung and Kuhn (2010) find transition rates in
the same order of magnitude. For simplicity, we associate the search skill depreciation shock
with long-term unemployment, which is usually defined as an unemployment spell of at least
one year. This yields a probability of losing job search skills of σs = 0.25. For the job search
technology, we follow Lentz (2009) and use an exponential specification
pij(lit) = 1− e−λj lit , for j ∈ {g , b}
where λg > λb . The search technology parameters are determined such that the equilibrium
unemployment rate is 7.5 percent and the equilibrium share of long-term unemployed households
to total unemployed households is 42 percent. The calibration values of the search technology
parameters depend on the equilibrium search effort which in turn depends on the specification
of the disutility search.
The preference parameters are calibrated as follows: As in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)
or Shimer and Werning (2006, 2007, 2008), disutility of search is linear in search effort
v(lit) = −A lit
In equilibrium, the parameter A is not separately identified from the parameters of the search
technology λg and λb . Consequently, there is one degree of freedom such that we can set the
scaling parameter to a numerically convenient value of A = 25. This implies λg = 7.2606 and
λb = 2.9999 in order to make the equilibrium match our calibration targets. The disutility
of being unemployed, ω, is calibrated to match the point elasticity of the job finding rate
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with respect to benefit payments. Empirically, this elasticity is hard to pin down, because
the data sets either do not include the required information to construct a precise measure of
benefit payments (IAB data), or there are too few observations to get reliable results (GSOEP).
Addison, Centeno and Portugal (2008) use a structural search model and the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) to estimate the elasticity for several European countries,
and for Germany they find values between ηθ,b = −1.66 and ηθ,b = −1.14. For the US, Meyer
and Mok (2007) use a quasi-experimental setup in which the maximum weekly benefit payments
in New York State were raised. Their approach allows the construction of different control groups
of households leading to substantial variation in the data to get reliable results.13 They find
that for the US, increasing the benefit rate by 1 percent leads to an increase in benefit duration
by 0.21 percent, and translating this number into an elasticity of the re-employment probability
with respect to benefit payments yields approximately ηθ,b = −0.2. Clearly, the benefit level in
the US is much lower than in Germany, which implies that the elasticity in Germany has to be
higher in absolute terms. However, Addison, Centeno and Portugal (2008) also estimate
the respective elasticity for the UK, which has labor market institutions comparable to the US.
For the UK, they find elasticities between ηθ,b = −0.62 and ηθ,b = −0.36, in absolute terms
higher that the estimates by Meyer and Mok (2007) for the US, indicating that the estimates
for Germany are upward biased, in absolute terms. For this reason, we take the lower bound,
ηθ,b = −1.14 for the benchmark calibration, yielding ω = 0.2668. Since the elasticity has a key
role in determining the effect of the labor market reforms on the aggregate unemployment rate,
we will run a sensitivity analysis for lower elasticities as well. Finally, the time-discount factor
β is set such that the aggregate private saving rate in equilibrium is 20 percent. This yields
β = 0.9799.
We calibrate the depreciation rates to δk = δh = 0.015, which is approximately 6 percent
per annum. For physical capital, this value lies within the range suggested by the literature.
For human capital, Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) find annual depreciation rates
between 0 and 4 percent. Accounting for the infinite horizon structure in our model, we have
13In particular, households can be separated into three groups: i.) those who are not affected by this policy
since they were not eligible to the maximum weekly benefit payments under the old regime, ii.) those who are
partially affected in the sense that their new weekly benefit payments lie between the old and the new maximum
weekly benefit level and iii.) those who are now eligible for the maximum benefit level under the new regime.
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to add an additional depreciation of 2 percent. Thus, a human capital depreciation rate of 6
percent corresponds to an upper bound of reasonable values suggested in the literature. The
i.i.d. depreciation shock to human capital is normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σs2t = 0.15, which, together with the employment shocks and loss of job specific skills,
implies a standard deviation of labor income in equilibrium that is in line with micro-evidence
for Germany, estimated by Krebs and Yao (2009).
Table 2: Calibration - Endogenous Parameters
parameter description value
preferences
β time preferences 0.9799
ω disutility of being unemployed 0.2668
production
z productivity 0.0794
labor market and transition rates
λg search technology parameter: good job seeker 7.2606
λb search technology parameter: bad job seeker 2.9999
parameters are chosen to match
aggregate saving rate 0.2000
aggregate quarterly consumption growth rate 0.0051
unemployment rate 0.0750
share of long-term unemployment 0.42
average benefit elasticity of reemployment probability −1.1400
Finally, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas
F (Kt, Het ) = z
(
Kt
)α (
Het
)1−α
with the capital share of output set to α = 0.36. The scaling parameter of the production
technology is chosen such that the annual equilibrium growth rate of aggregate consumption is
2 percent. This gives z = 0.0794.
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5.2 Growth and Welfare Effect of German Labor Market Reform
The first reform, which was implemented in January 2005, replaced the Unemployment Assis-
tance with Unemployment Benefit II, which requires tighter means tests and is independent of
previous earnings.14 Mapping this new system into our model (where unemployment benefits
depend on the stock of human capital), average benefit payments in the second tier decrease
substantially to about 45 percent of previous net earnings. The regulations of the second reform
became binding in February 2006. The eligibility period for Unemployment Benefit I 15 was
reduced for all unemployed households, and a particularly strong reduction was implemented
for older unemployed agents. Based on Schmitz and Steiner (2007) we calculate that the
average eligibility period dropped from 19.3 to 13.5 months, thus σb increases from 0.1554 to
0.2222.
Table 3: Macroeconomic Effects of the Labor Market Reforms
benchmark reform 1 reform 2
unemployment rate 7.50% 6.38% 6.25%
share of long-term unemployment 42.0% 32.8% 31.7%
annualized growth rate 2.00% 2.06% 2.08%
level effect on consumption1 0.00% 0.96% 1.12%
consumption tax rate 3.66% 2.69% 2.54%
capital-to-labor ratio 0.6950 0.6943 0.6927
1 Deviation form benchmark in percent.
The macroeconomic effects of both reforms are given in table 3. The main findings are as
follows: First, implementing the first reform leads to a substantial decrease in the equilibrium
unemployment rate from 7.5 to 6.4 percent. Clearly, unemployed households in the second
tier, that means those who already lost their entitlement to high benefit payments, increase
their search effort in order to escape the state with low benefits more quickly. Moreover, for
unemployed households who are still eligible for high benefit payments, losing their entitlement
14In fact, by the introduction of Unemployment Benefit II, Unemployment Assistance and Social Assistance
were merged.
15The pre-reform Unemployment Benefit was relabeled as Unemployment Benefit I, in order to make the dis-
tinction between the newly introduced Unemployment Benefit II.
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becomes more threatening now, wherefore they increase their search effort, as well. Decomposing
the contribution of both mechanisms to the decrease in the unemployment rate reveals that 57
percent of the decrease is due to the reaction of the households who lost their entitlement to high
benefit payments directly. The remaining 43 percent are explained by search effort adjustments
due to the increasing threat, that means, the increasing risk. The adjustments of the individual
search effort decisions to the labor market reforms are given in table 4.
When the eligibility period is reduced according to the second reform, those households who
still enjoy the high benefit rate will intensify their job search to avoid losing their entitlements
to high benefit payments. However, in order of magnitude, this effect is not very important, and
the unemployment rate decreases by 0.13 percentage points with respect to the first reform. Put
differently, the search effort decision and thus the re-employment probability is quite insensitive
to the duration of high benefit entitlements. This finding is consistent with recent empirical
research, e.g. by Caliendo, Tatsiramos and Uhlendorff (2009) and Fitzenberger and
Wilke (2010). In particular, Caliendo, Tatsiramos and Uhlendorff (2009) find that
the re-employment probability peaks only for those households who are close to the exhaustion
period of high benefit entitlements. Thus, if we reduce the eligibility period, only the households
who become close to the new exhaustion period will raise their search effort, whereas the other
households’ search effort decision is almost unaffected. Our model, however, abstracts from the
exhaustion period effect, since every unemployed household with high entitlements faces the
same expected period of remaining entitled to high benefits, 1σb quarters. Thus, no unemployed
agent is close to the exhaustion period, making the adjustment of search effort negligible, and the
equilibrium unemployment rate is hardly affected by the implementation of the second reform.
Since we abstract from the exhaustion period effect, our results for the second reform have to
be interpreted more cautiously as a lower bound.
Second, the average consumption growth rate increases by 0.06 and 0.08 percentage points
on an annual basis for reform 1 and reform 2, respectively. For the average consumption growth
rate, there are two detrimental forces at work. On the one hand, human capital risk increases and
discourages households to accumulate human capital, which leads to a downward pressure on the
aggregate consumption growth rate. On the other hand, there are more employed households in
the new equilibrium who accumulate human capital at higher rates than unemployed households.
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Table 4: Household Policies
benchmark reform 1 reform 2
θ 0.3916 0.3941 0.3943
pin(l(ugh)) 0.5172 0.5379 0.5427
pin(l(ugl )) 0.5172 0.5672 0.5670
pis(l(ubh)) 0.1667 0.2137 0.2233
pis(l(ubl )) 0.1667 0.2618 0.2616
This leads to an upward pressure on the aggregate consumption growth rate. In our numerical
example, the second effect dominates the first one. In a similar vein, we find that the equilibrium
capital-to-labor ratio is almost unaffected by the labor market reforms since there are two
detrimental forces at work. Discouraging human capital investment obviously raises KtHet while
the employment effect tends to raise the absolute amount of human capital used in production
such that KtHet decreases. Numerically, both effects almost offset each other.
Third, the increase in average consumption growth is accompanied by a considerable level
effect on equilibrium consumption. In particular, the decreasing unemployment rate leads to
an increase in production which finally allows an upward shift of the consumption path by 0.96
and 1.12 percent for reform 1 and 2, respectively. From a different point of view, we see that
the reduction of the marginal benefit rate in the second tier, reform 1, the reduction of the
eligibility period to high benefit payments in the first tier, reform 2, and the decrease in the
total unemployment rate substantially reduce the total amount of benefit payments. Hence, the
government needs less tax revenue in order to meet its balanced budget constraint, wherefore it
reduces the consumption tax rate from 3.66 to 2.69 and 2.54 percent for labor market reforms 1
and 2, respectively. Clearly, reducing the cost of consumption heaves the consumption path to
a higher level.
Considering social welfare, which we define as the equally weighted average of the households’
life time utility, there are again two detrimental forces at work when we implement the labor
market reforms. On the one hand, households enjoy a tax cut which allows them to consume
more in each period and, thus, raises their lifetime utility. On the other hand, reducing benefit
payments and shortening the entitlement period to high benefit payments increase the individual
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Table 5: Welfare Effect of Labor Market Reforms
reform 1 reform 2
welfare level insurance welfare level insurance
∆ 0.41% 1.93% −1.52% 0.45% 2.02% −1.57%
∆ | s1t = e 0.48% 1.93% −1.45% 0.52% 2.02% −1.50%
∆ | s1t = ugh 0.17% 1.93% −1.76% 0.18% 2.02% −1.84%
∆ | s1t = ugl −0.32% 1.93% −2.15% −0.27% 2.02% −2.29%
∆ | s1t = ubh −0.53% 1.93% −2.46% −0.63% 2.02% −2.65%
∆ | s1t = ubl −1.70% 1.93% −3.63% −1.65% 2.02% −3.67%
income risk which leads to losses of lifetime utility when households are risk averse. In order to
quantify the welfare effects, we follow Lucas (1987) and ask the households in the pre-reform
state how much additional consumption do they need in each period in order to be indifferent
between implementing the reform or not. Specifically, let ∆ denote the respective percentage
share satisfying
ES
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt log((1 + ∆) ct)
]
= ES
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt log creft
]
where {ct}∞t=0 denotes the households’ consumption plans without labor market reforms and
{creft }∞t=0 is the consumption plan when the reform is implemented in period 0. In table 5, we
we report the welfare effects16 and find substantial welfare gains of 0.41 and 0.45 for reform 1 and
reform 2, respectively. Hence, the welfare improving level effect of consumption dominates the
welfare reducing effect from losing insurance. Clearly, the currently employed households benefit
most from the labor market reforms since the loss of insurance imposes only second order risk
to them in the sense that they first have to become unemployed before being directly exposed
to the risk of losing the high entitlements. More surprisingly, those unemployed agents who
receive the high benefit payments and are good job seekers realize a slightly positive welfare
gain from the labor market reforms. Hence, for them it still holds that the level effect of a
16For the computation of the welfare effects, we take the transition phase into account. Details on the compu-
tation are deferred to the appendix.
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higher consumption path dominates the loss of insurance. For the other types of unemployed
agents, however, the loss of insurance dominates, leading to substantial welfare losses. Table
5 also reports the decomposition of the welfare effect into level and insurance effect. Further
reductions in the benefit rate, however lead only to negligible additional welfare gains, if at all.
Table 6: Macroeconomic Effects of the Labor Market Reform 1 - Different Target Elasticities
benchmark ηpi,b = −1.14 ηpi,b = −1 ηpi,b = −0.5
unemployment rate 7.50% 6.38% 6.46% 6.82%
share of long-term unemployment 42.0% 32.8% 33.5% 36.6%
annualized growth rate 2.00% 2.06% 2.05% 2.03%
level effect on consumption1 0.00% 0.96% 0.93% 0.83%
consumption tax rate 3.66% 2.69% 2.72% 2.81%
capital-to-labor ratio 0.6950 0.6943 0.6944 0.6946
1 Deviation form benchmark in percent.
Clearly, the reaction of the equilibrium unemployment rate to the labor market reforms de-
pends crucially on the elasticity of the the job finding probability with respect to the benefit
rate. The more elastic the job finding probability, the stronger the decrease in the unemployment
rate which finally leads to a stronger increase in aggregate production and social welfare. Put
differently, the more elastic the job finding probability, the stronger the level effect of consump-
tion to social welfare. To assess the importance of this elasticity with respect to our results, we
recalibrate the model to a target elasticity of ηpi,b = −1.0 and ηpi,b = −0.5 which is already in the
range of values estimated for the United Kingdom and thus, a lower bound (in absolute terms)
for our analysis. Since the second reform has only negligible effects, we focus on the first reform
only. The macroeconomic effects of the re-calibrated model are given in table 6. As expected,
the more inelastic the job finding probability with respect to benefit payments, the higher the
unemployment rate: setting the elasticity to −1.0 yields an equilibrium unemployment rate of
6.5 percent and for an elasticity of −0.5, the unemployment only decreases to 6.8 percent. The
smaller employment effect on aggregate output finally translates into lower welfare effects that
are given in table 7.
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Table 7: Welfare Effect of Labor Market Reform 1 - Different Target Elasticities
ηpi,b = −1.14 ηpi,b = −1.0 ηpi,b = −0.5
∆ 0.41% 0.38% 0.23%
∆ | s1t = e 0.48% 0.45% 0.31%
∆ | s1t = ugh 0.17% 0.14% −0.03%
∆ | s1t = ugl −0.32% −0.36% −0.55%
∆ | s1t = ubh −0.53% −0.59% −0.84%
∆ | s1t = ubl −1.70% −1.77% −2.10%
6 Conclusions
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with labor market search and in-
complete markets which remains despite ex-post heterogenous agents tractable in the sense
that the equilibrium can be characterized without knowing the underlying wealth distribution.
The model allows the analysis of the unemployment insurance’s major tradeoff between insur-
ing households against earning and consumption volatility and providing an incentive to exert
search effort. In contrast to the existing literature, our model also considers long-run growth
effect of the unemployment insurance system.
Applying the model to evaluate the welfare and growth effects of the recent labor market
reforms in Germany, we find that society as whole benefits from these reforms and, furthermore,
even short-term unemployed benefit since the loss of insurance is dominated by the employment
effect. The results remain quite robust throughout variations of the critical calibration target,
the elasticity of the job finding rate with respect to the benefit level. Although this reform
yields substantial welfare gains, decreasing the benefit rate in the second tier further only causes
negligible additional welfare gains since the social welfare function is already quite flat in bh−bl -
space.
Further research is devoted to the analytical derivation of optimal unemployment schedules
with explicit focus on the equilibrium growth effects of those reforms. The analysis of optimal
unemployment insurance is feasible due to the straightforward simple characterization of the
stationary equilibrium in our model.
23
References
Acemouglu, Daron/Shimer, Robert 1999: Efficient Unemployment Insurance, in: Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 107(5), pp. 893-928.
Acemouglu, Daron/Shimer, Robert 2000: Productivity Gains from Unemployment In-
surance, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 44, pp. 1145-1224.
Aiyagari, Rao S. 1994: Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving, in: Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 109(3), pp. 659-684.
Andolfatto, David 1996: Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search, in: American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 86(1), pp. 112-132.
Addison, John T./Centeno, Ma`rio/Portugal, Pedro 2008: Unemployment Benefits
and Reservation Wages: Key Elasticities from a Stripped-Down Job-Search Approach, IZA
Discussion Paper No. 3357, Bonn.
Bachmann, Ronald 2005: Labour Market Dynamics in Germany: Hirings, Separations, and
Job-to-Job Transitions over the Business Cycle, SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2005 - 045,
Berlin.
Burda, Michael C./Mertens, Antje 1998: Wages and Worker Displacement in Germany,
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1869, London.
Benhabib, Jess/Bull, Clive 1983: Job Search: The Choice of Intensity, in: Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 91(5), pp. 747-764.
Bo¨hringer, Christoph/Boeters, Stefan/Feil, Michael 2005: Taxation and Unem-
ployment: an Applied General Equilibrium Approach, in: Economic Modelling, Vol.
22(1), pp. 81-108.
Browning, Martin/Hansen, Lars. P./Heckman, James. J. 1999: Micro Data and
General Equilibrium Models, in: Taylor, John B./Woodford, Michael (eds.): Handbook of
Macroeconomics. Handbooks in Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 543-633, Amsterdam, New York
and Oxford.
24
Caliendo, Marcus/Tatsiramos, Konstantinos/Uhlendorff, Arne 2009: Benefit Du-
ration, Unemployment Duration and Job Match Quality: A Regression-Disontinuity Ap-
proach, in: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4670, Bonn.
Costain, James S./Reiter, Michael 2005: Stabilization Versus Insurance: Welfare Effects
of Procyclical Taxation Under Incomplete Markets, mimeo.
Farber, Henry G. 2003: Job Loss in the United States: 1981 - 2001, NBER Working Paper
No. 9707, Cambridge (MA).
Fitzenberger, Bernd/Wilke, Ralf A. 2010: New Insights into Unemployment Duration
and Post-Unemployment Earnings in Germany, in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics (forthcoming).
Franz, Wolfgang 2009: Arbeitsmarkto¨konomik, 7th edition, Heidelberg.
Franz, Wolfgang/Gu¨rtzgen, Nicole/Schubert, Stefanie/Clauss, Markus 2007:
Reformen im Niedriglohnsektor − eine Integrierte CGE-Mikrosimulationsstudie der
Arbeitsangebots- und Bescha¨ftigungseffekte, in: ZEW Discussion Paper No. 07-085,
Mannheim.
I˙mrohorogˇlu, Ays¸e 1992: Cost of Business Cycles with Indivisibilities and Liquidity Con-
straints, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97(6), pp. 1364-1383.
Hopenhayn, Hugo A./Nicolini, Juan P. 1997: Optimal Unemployment Insurance, in:
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105(2), pp. 412-438.
Hubbard, R. Glenn/Skinner, Jonathan/Zeldes, Stephen P. 1995: Precautionary Sav-
ing and Social Insurance, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103(2), pp. 360-399.
Huggett, Mark 1993: The Risk-Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agent Incomplete-Insurance
Economies, in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 17(5-6), pp. 953-969.
Immervoll, Herwig/Kleven, Henrik J./Kreiner, Claus T./Saez, Emmanuel 2007:
Welfare Reform in European Countries: a Microsimulation Analysis, in: The Economic
Journal, Vol. 117(1), pp. 1-44.
25
Jacobson, Louis S./Lalonde, Robert J./Sullivan, Daniel G. 1993: Earning Losses of
Displaced Workers, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 83(4), pp. 685-709.
Jones, Larry E./Manuelli, Rodolfo E. 1990: A Convex Model of Equilibrium Growth:
Theory and Policy Implications, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98(5), pp. 1008-
1038.
Jung, Philip/Kuhn, Moritz 2010: Labor Market Rigidity and Business Cycle Volatility,
University of Mannheim, mimeo.
Kletzer, Lori G. 1998: Job Displacement, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(1),
pp. 115-136.
Krebs, Tom 2003: Human Capital Risk and Economic Growth, in: Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 118(2), pp. 709-744.
Krebs, Tom 2006: Recursive Equilibrium in Endogenous Growth Models with Incomplete
Markets, in: Economic Theory, Vol. 29(3), pp. 505-523.
Krebs, Tom/Yao, Yao 2009: Labor Income Risk in German: An Empirical Analysis, Uni-
versity of Mannheim, mimeo.
Krusell, Per/Mukoyama, Toshihiko/S¸ahin, Ays¸egu¨l 2009: Labor-Market Matching
with Precautionary Savings and Aggregate Fluctuations, in: NBER Working Papers 15282,
Cambridge (MA).
Launov, Andrey/Wa¨lde, Klaus 2010: Estimating Incentive and Welfare Effects of Non-
Stationary Unemployment Benefits, in: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4958, Bonn.
Lentz, Rasmus 2009: Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model
with Savings, in: Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 12(1), pp. 37-57.
Ljungqvist, Lars/Sargent, Thomas E. 1998: The European Unemployment Dilemma,
in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106(3), pp. 514-550.
Lucas, Robert E. 1987: Models of Business Cycles, Oxford.
26
Lucas, Robert E. 1988: On the Mechanics of Economic Development, in: Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, Vol. 22(1), pp. 3-42.
Lucas, Robert E./Prescott, Edward C. 1974: Equilibrium Search and Unemployment,
in: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 7(2), pp. 188-209.
McCall, John J. 1970: Economics of Information and Job Search, in: Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 84(1), pp. 113-126.
Meghir, Costas/Pistaferri, Luigi 2004: Income Variance Dynamics and Heterogeneity,
in: Econometrica, Vol. 72(1), pp. 1-32.
Merz, Monika 1995: Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle, in: Journal
of Monetary Economics, Vol. 36(2), pp. 269-300.
Meyer, Bruce D./Mok, Wallace K. C. (2007): Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the
Effects of Unemployment Insurance from New York State, in: NBER Working Paper No.
12865.
Nakajima, Makoto 2008: Business Cycles in the Equilibrium Model of Labor Market Search
and Self-Insurance, mimeo.
OECD 2006: Employment Outlook 2006, Paris.
Phelps, Edmund S. 1968: Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-Market Equilibrium, in: Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, pp. 678-711.
Pissarides, Christopher A. 1979: Job Matchings with State Employment Agencies and
Random Search, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 89(356), pp. 818-833.
Pissarides, Christopher A. 2000: Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd edition, Cam-
bridge (MA).
Schmitz, Hendrik/Steiner, Viktor 2007: Benefit-Entitlement Effects and the Duration
of Unemployment: An Ex-Ante Evaluation of Recent Labour Market Reforms in Germany,
IZA Discussion Paper No. 2681, Bonn.
27
Shavell, Steven/Weiss, Laurence 1979: The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insur-
ance Benefits over Time, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87(6), pp. 1347-1362.
Shimer, Robert/Werning, Iva´n 2007: Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance,
in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122(3), pp. 1145-1185.
Shimer, Robert/ Werning, Iva´n 2008: Liquidity and Insurance for Unemployed Workers,
in: American Economic Review, Vol. 98(5), pp. 1922-1942.
Storesletten, Kjetil/Telmer, Chris I./Yaron, Amir 2004: Cyclical Dynamics in Id-
iosyncratic Labor Market Risk, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112(3), pp. 695-717.
28
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
S
ta
te
T
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
M
a
tr
ix
Π
(s
′ 1i
t
×
s 1
i,
t+
1
)
=
                         
1
−
σ
x
σ
x
0
0
0
pi
n
(l
it
)
(1
−
pi
n
(l
it
))
(1
−
σ
s
)
(1
−
σ
b
)
(1
−
pi
n
(l
it
))
(1
−
σ
s
)
σ
b
(1
−
pi
n
(l
it
))
σ
s
(1
−
σ
b
)
(1
−
pi
n
(l
it
))
σ
s
σ
b
pi
n
(l
it
)
0
(1
−
pi
n
(l
it
))
(1
−
σ
s
)
0
(1
−
pi
n
(l
it
))
σ
s
pi
s (
l i
t)
0
0
(1
−
pi
s (
l i
t)
)
(1
−
σ
b
)
(1
−
pi
s (
l i
t)
)
σ
b
pi
s (
l i
t)
0
0
0
(1
−
pi
s (
l i
t)
)
                         
29
P
ro
o
f
o
f
P
ro
p
o
si
ti
o
n
1
,
D
e
te
rm
in
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
V
a
lu
e
F
u
n
ct
io
n
In
or
de
r
to
fin
d
th
e
va
lu
e
fu
nc
ti
on
,
w
e
ap
pl
y
th
e
m
et
ho
d
of
gu
es
s
an
d
ve
ri
fy
.
Fo
r
co
nv
en
ie
nc
e,
w
e
su
pp
re
ss
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
cy
of
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
th
e
re
tu
rn
fu
nc
ti
on
s
on
th
e
ag
gr
eg
at
e
st
at
e
k˜
.
In
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
,
gu
es
s
V
(θ
it
,
w
it
,
s i
t)
=
A
(s
1
it
)
lo
g[
(1
+
r(
θ i
t,
s i
t)
)
w
it
]+
B
(s
1
it
)
(1
5)
T
og
et
he
r
w
it
h
th
e
op
ti
m
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
po
lic
y,
th
e
B
el
lm
an
eq
ua
ti
on
(4
)
re
ad
s
A
(s
1
it
)
lo
g[
(1
+
r(
θ i
t,
s i
t)
)
w
it
]+
B
(s
1
it
)
=
m
ax
θ i
,t
+
1
,l
it
{ log
1
−
β
1
+
τ c
+
lo
g[
(1
+
r(
θ i
t,
s i
t)
)
w
it
]−
v
(l
it
)
−
1 s
1
it
=
u
ω
+
β
E S
[ A(s
1
i,
t+
1
)l
og
[(
1
+
r(
θ i
,t
+
1
,
s i
,t
+
1
))
w
i,
t+
1
]+
B
(s
1
i,
t+
1
)]}
C
om
bi
ni
ng
th
e
op
ti
m
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
po
lic
y
an
d
th
e
bu
dg
et
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
yi
el
ds
w
i,
t+
1
=
β
(1
+
r(
θ i
t,
s i
t)
)
w
it
.
T
hu
s
A
(s
1
it
)
lo
g[
(1
+
r(
θ i
t,
s i
t)
)
w
it
]+
B
(s
1
it
)
=
m
ax
θ i
,t
+
1
,l
it
{ (1+
β
E S
[A
(s
1
i,
t+
1
)]
)
lo
g[
(1
+
r(
θ i
t,
s i
t)
)
w
it
]+
lo
g
1
−
β
1
+
τ c
+
β
E S
[A
(s
1
i,
t+
1
)]
lo
g
β
−
v
(l
it
)
−
1 s
1
it
=
u
ω
+
β
E S
[ A(s
1
i,
t+
1
)
lo
g(
1
+
r(
θ i
,t
+
1
,
s i
,t
+
1
))
+
B
(s
1
i,
t+
1
)]}
30
N
ow
su
pp
os
e,
w
e
al
re
ad
y
fo
un
d
a
so
lu
ti
on
fo
r
θ i
,t
+
1
an
d
l i
t
th
at
ar
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
of
cu
rr
en
t
st
at
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
θ i
t,
w
it
an
d
s 2
it
.
T
he
n,
th
e
m
et
ho
d
of
un
de
te
rm
in
ed
co
effi
ci
en
ts
gi
ve
s
A
(s
1
it
)
=
1
1
−
β
an
d
th
e
B
el
lm
an
eq
ua
ti
on
th
en
si
m
pl
ifi
es
to
B
(s
1
it
)
=
m
ax
θ i
,t
+
1
,l
it
{ log
1
−
β
1
+
τ c
+
β
1
−
β
lo
g
β
−
v
(l
it
)
−
1 s
1
it
=
u
ω
+
β
E S
[ 1 1−
β
lo
g(
1
+
r(
θ i
,t
+
1
,
s i
,t
+
1
))
+
B
(s
1
i,
t+
1
)]}
(1
6)
O
bv
io
us
ly
,t
he
op
ti
m
al
po
rt
fo
lio
ch
oi
ce
as
w
el
la
s
th
e
op
ti
m
al
se
ar
ch
in
te
ns
it
y
th
at
so
lv
e
th
e
B
el
lm
an
eq
ua
ti
on
in
in
te
ns
iv
e
fo
rm
,e
qu
at
io
n
(1
6)
ar
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
of
th
e
cu
rr
en
t
st
at
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
θ i
t,
w
it
an
d
s 2
it
.
T
o
pu
t
it
di
ffe
re
nt
ly
:
θ i
,t
+
1
an
d
l i
t
on
ly
de
pe
nd
on
s 1
it
an
d
s 3
it
an
d
th
e
ex
og
en
ou
s
m
od
el
pa
ra
m
et
er
s,
w
hi
ch
is
co
ns
is
te
nt
w
it
h
ou
r
pr
ev
io
us
co
nj
ec
tu
re
.
T
he
op
ti
m
al
po
lic
ie
s
tr
an
sf
or
m
th
e
fu
nc
ti
on
al
eq
ua
ti
on
(1
6)
in
to
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
pl
an
eq
ua
ti
on
su
ch
th
at
w
e
ca
n
ea
si
ly
so
lv
e
fo
r
B
(s
1
),
th
er
eb
y
ve
ri
fy
in
g
ou
r
in
it
ia
l
gu
es
s
on
th
e
fu
nc
ti
on
al
fo
rm
of
th
e
va
lu
e
fu
nc
ti
on
,
eq
ua
ti
on
(1
5)
.
T
hi
s
co
m
pl
et
es
ou
r
pr
oo
f.
31
M
a
rk
e
t
C
le
a
ri
n
g
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
L
et
st
=
(s
t,
s t
−1
,s
t−
2
,.
..
)
de
no
te
th
e
hi
st
or
y
of
sh
oc
ks
,
w
hi
ch
de
sc
ri
be
s
th
e
hi
st
or
y
of
ty
pe
-s
t -
ag
en
t.
T
ot
al
w
ea
lt
h
in
th
e
ec
on
om
y
at
t
+
1
is
de
fin
ed
as
W
t+
1
=
∑ stw
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
(1
7)
T
he
ag
gr
eg
at
e
w
ea
lt
h
of
th
os
e
pe
op
le
w
it
h
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
re
ad
s
W
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ st−2w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
(1
8)
an
d
th
ei
r
sh
ar
e
of
to
ta
l
w
ea
lt
h
is
de
fin
ed
as
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
=
W
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
W
t+
1
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ st−
2
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
∑ st
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
=
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
∑ st
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
)
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ st−
2
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
W
t
W
t+
1
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ st−
2
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
(1
9)
W
e
ar
e
no
w
in
te
re
st
ed
in
ho
w
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
sh
ar
es
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
ev
ol
ve
ov
er
ti
m
e.
B
y
th
e
op
ti
m
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
po
lic
y
(8
),
w
e
kn
ow
th
at
th
e
la
w
of
m
ot
io
n
of
w
ea
lt
h
in
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
is
go
ve
rn
ed
by
w
i,
t+
1
=
β
[1
+
r(
θ i
t(
s i
,t
−1
),
s i
t;
k˜
t)
]
w
it
.
U
si
ng
th
is
co
nd
it
io
n,
to
ge
th
er
w
it
h
ou
r
32
M
ar
ko
v
pr
oc
es
s
th
at
go
ve
rn
s
th
e
ev
ol
ut
io
n
of
th
e
st
at
e,
w
e
ca
n
re
w
ri
te
th
e
de
fin
it
io
n
of
to
ta
l
w
ea
lt
h,
eq
ua
ti
on
(1
7)
,
as
fo
llo
w
s:
W
t+
1
=
∑ stw
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
=
∑ s t
∑ st−1
w
t+
1
(s
t,
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
∑ s t
∑ st−1
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
∑ s t−2
∑ st−3
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
|s
t−
3
)
pi
(s
t−
3
)
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
[ ∑ s t−2
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
∑ st−3
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
2
|s
t−
3
)
pi
(s
t−
3
)
] pi(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ s t−2
ρ
(s
t−
1
,s
t−
2
)
W
t
H
en
ce
,
W
t
W
t+
1
=
1
∑ s t
∑ s t−
1
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ s t−
2
ρ
(s
t−
1
,s
t−
2
)
(2
0)
33
In
ad
di
ti
on
,
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ st−
2
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
∑ st−
2
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
∑ s t−
2
∑ st−
3
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
|s
t−
3
)pi
(s
t−
3
)
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
∑ s t−2
∑ st−
3
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
2
|s
t−
3
)pi
(s
t−
3
)
∑ st−
1
w
t(
st
−1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
)
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
∑ s t−2
ρ
t(
s t
−1
,s
t−
2
)
(2
1)
U
si
ng
(2
0)
an
d
(2
1)
in
(1
9)
yi
el
ds
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
la
w
of
m
ot
io
n
fo
r
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
sh
ar
e:
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
=
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
∑ s t−
2
ρ
t(
s t
−1
,s
t−
2
)
∑ s t
∑ s t−
1
β
[1
+
r(
θ t
(s
t−
1
),
s t
;
k˜
t)
]
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ s t−
2
ρ
t(
s t
−1
,s
t−
2
)
(2
2)
34
N
ow
,
co
ns
id
er
th
e
ag
gr
eg
at
e
st
oc
k
of
ph
ys
ic
al
an
d
hu
m
an
ca
pi
ta
l
us
ed
in
pr
od
uc
ti
on
.
B
y
de
fin
it
io
n,
th
e
st
oc
k
of
ph
ys
ic
al
ca
pi
ta
l
us
ed
in
pr
od
uc
ti
on
re
ad
s
K
t+
1
=
∑ st
k
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
=
∑ st
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
=
∑ st
θ t
+
1
(s
t )
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
∑ st−2
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
pi
(s
t
|s
t−
1
)
∑ st−2
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t−
1
|s
t−
2
)
pi
(s
t−
2
)
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
W
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
W
t+
1
(2
3)
Fo
r
th
e
st
oc
k
of
hu
m
an
ca
pi
ta
l
th
at
is
us
ed
in
pr
od
uc
ti
on
,
on
ly
th
os
e
ag
en
ts
th
at
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
em
pl
oy
ed
,
ar
e
re
le
va
nt
.
H
en
ce
,
H
e t+
1
=
∑ st
pi
(s
1
,t
+
1
=
e
|s
t )
[1
−
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
]
w
t+
1
(s
t )
pi
(s
t )
w
hi
ch
si
m
pl
ifi
es
,
by
th
e
si
m
ila
r
pr
oc
ed
ur
e
as
ab
ov
e,
to
H
e t+
1
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−1
pi
(s
1
,t
+
1
=
e
|s
t)
[1
−
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
]
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
W
t+
1
(2
4)
35
B
y
(2
3)
an
d
(2
4)
,
th
e
ca
pi
ta
l-
to
-l
ab
or
ra
ti
o
re
ad
s
k˜
t+
1
=
∑ s t
∑ s t−
1
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
∑ s t
∑ s t−
1
pi
(s
t+
1
=
e
|s
t)
[1
−
θ t
+
1
(s
t)
]
ρ
t+
1
(s
t,
s t
−1
)
(2
5)
C
le
ar
ly
,
st
at
io
na
ri
ty
of
th
e
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
im
pl
ie
s
ρ
t
=
ρ
,
∀t
.
T
hu
s,
ev
er
y
k˜
th
at
so
lv
es
th
is
co
nd
it
io
n
(n
ot
e
th
at
th
e
ra
ti
os
ρ
de
fin
ed
pr
ev
io
us
ly
,
de
pe
nd
on
th
e
ca
pi
ta
l
to
la
bo
r
ra
ti
o
vi
a
th
e
re
tu
rn
fu
nc
ti
on
s)
im
pl
ic
it
ly
so
lv
es
m
ar
ke
t
cl
ea
ri
ng
on
th
e
in
pu
t
fa
ct
or
m
ar
ke
ts
.
O
bs
er
ve
,
m
ar
ke
t
cl
ea
ri
ng
is
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
of
ag
gr
eg
at
e
w
ea
lt
h.
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e
lf
a
re
E
ff
e
ct
s
In
th
is
ap
pe
nd
ix
,
w
e
sh
ow
th
e
de
ta
ils
on
ho
w
to
co
m
pu
te
th
e
w
el
fa
re
eff
ec
ts
in
ou
r
m
od
el
w
it
h
tr
an
si
ti
on
dy
na
m
ic
s.
S
te
p
1:
C
al
cu
la
te
th
e
st
at
io
na
ry
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
be
fo
re
an
d
af
te
r
th
e
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
of
th
e
re
fo
rm
.
In
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
,
ca
lc
ul
at
e
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
po
rt
fo
lio
ch
oi
ce
s
an
d
se
ar
ch
in
te
ns
it
ie
s,
th
e
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ca
pi
ta
l-
to
-l
ab
or
ra
ti
os
an
d
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
sh
ar
es
ρ
t(
s t
−1
,s
t−
2
).
Su
pp
os
e
w
e
im
pl
em
en
t
th
e
la
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
re
fo
rm
in
t
=
0
an
d
th
e
ne
w
st
at
io
na
ry
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
is
re
ac
he
d
in
t
=
T
.
T
he
n,
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
lif
et
im
e
ut
ili
ti
es
re
ad
V
(θ
i0
,
w
i0
,
s i
0
)
=
[ 1 1−
β
lo
g(
1
+
r(
θ i
0
,
s i
0
;
k˜
))
+
B
(s
1
i0
,s
3
i0
)] +
1
1
−
β
lo
g
w
i0
V
(θ
iT
,
w
iT
,
s i
T
)
=
[ 1 1−
β
lo
g(
1
+
r(
θ i
T
,
s i
T
;
k˜
))
+
B
(s
1
iT
,s
3
iT
)] +
1
1
−
β
lo
g
w
iT
O
bs
er
ve
th
at
th
e
so
ci
al
pl
an
ne
r
ca
nn
ot
si
m
pl
y
ag
gr
eg
at
e
th
e
lif
et
im
e
ut
ili
ti
es
in
t
=
0
an
d
t
=
T
an
d
co
m
pa
re
th
em
,
be
ca
us
e
th
e
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
of
ag
en
ts
an
d
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
is
di
ffe
re
nt
in
t
=
0
an
d
t
=
T
.
N
ev
er
th
el
es
s,
as
w
e
w
ill
sh
ow
be
lo
w
,
it
is
su
ffi
ci
en
t
to
co
m
pu
te
th
e
te
rm
in
sq
ua
re
br
ac
ke
ts
,
w
hi
ch
is
pe
rf
ec
tl
y
fe
as
ib
le
,
an
d
fo
r
co
nv
en
ie
nc
e,
w
e
de
fin
e
V˜
iT
=
1
1
−
β
lo
g(
1
+
r(
θ i
T
,
s i
T
;
k˜
))
+
B
(s
1
iT
,s
3
iT
)
su
ch
th
at
V
(θ
iT
,
w
iT
,
s i
T
)
=
V˜
iT
+
1
1
−
β
lo
g
w
iT
S
te
p
2:
F
ix
T
.
Si
nc
e
in
ou
r
m
od
el
,
th
e
tr
an
si
ti
on
fr
om
th
e
ol
d
to
th
e
ne
w
st
at
io
na
ry
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
is
ve
ry
fa
st
,
it
su
ffi
ce
s
to
se
t
T
=
25
.
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3:
G
ue
ss
a
se
qu
en
ce
of
w
ea
lt
h
sh
ar
es
{ρ
t(
s t
−1
,s
t−
2
)}
T t=
0
.
S
te
p
4:
Si
nc
e
t
=
T
is
al
re
ad
y
th
e
ne
w
eq
ui
lib
ri
um
,w
e
kn
ow
θ i
T
(s
i,
T
−1
)
an
d
he
nc
e,
l i
,T
−1
.
P
ut
ti
ng
it
di
ffe
re
nt
ly
,w
e
kn
ow
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
de
ci
si
on
s
m
ad
e
in
pe
ri
od
T
−
1.
T
hu
s,
w
e
ca
n
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
co
ns
id
er
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
de
ci
si
on
in
pe
ri
od
T
−
2.
T
he
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
B
el
lm
an
eq
ua
ti
on
re
ad
s
V
(θ
i,
T
−2
,
w
i,
T
−2
,
s i
,T
−2
)
=
m
ax
{ log
c i
,T
−2
−
v
(l
i,
T
−2
)
−
1 s
1
i,
T
−
2
=
u
ω
+
β
E
[ log
c i
,T
−1
−
v
(l
i,
T
−1
)
−
1 s
1
i,
T
−
1
=
u
ω
+
β
( V˜ iT
+
1
1
−
β
lo
g
w
iT
)]}
=
m
ax
{ log
c i
,T
−2
−
v
(l
i,
T
−2
)
−
1 s
1
i,
T
−
2
=
u
ω
+
β
E[ lo
g
1
−
β
1
+
τ c
,T
−1
[1
+
r(
θ i
,T
−1
,
s i
,T
−1
;k˜
i,
T
−1
)]
w
i,
T
−1
−
v
(l
i,
T
−1
)
−
1 s
1
i,
T
−
1
=
u
ω
+
β
( E[V˜
iT
]+
1
1
−
β
lo
g
β
[1
+
r(
θ i
,T
−1
,
s i
,T
−1
;k˜
i,
T
−1
)]
w
i,
T
−1
)]}
W
he
re
th
e
la
st
lin
e
fo
llo
w
s
fr
om
th
e
op
ti
m
al
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
po
lic
y
an
d
it
s
im
pl
ie
d
la
w
of
m
ot
io
n
fo
r
in
di
vi
du
al
w
ea
lt
h
ho
ld
in
gs
.
Fo
r
gi
ve
n
w
ea
lt
h
sh
ar
es
in
pe
ri
od
T
−
1,
w
e
ca
n
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y
so
lv
e
fo
r
th
e
op
ti
m
al
po
lic
ie
s
in
T
−
2
an
d
th
e
ca
pi
ta
l-
to
-l
ab
or
ra
ti
o
in
T
−
1.
N
ot
e
th
at
th
e
op
ti
m
al
po
lic
ie
s
ar
e
w
ea
lt
h
in
de
pe
nd
en
t,
ev
en
du
ri
ng
th
e
tr
an
si
ti
on
ph
as
e.
W
it
h
th
es
e
re
su
lt
s,
w
e
co
m
pu
te
V˜
T
−1
=
lo
g
1
−
β
1
+
τ c
,T
−1
[1
+
r(
θ i
,T
−1
,
s i
,T
−1
;k˜
i,
T
−1
)]
−
v
(l
i,
T
−1
)
−
1 s
1
i,
T
−
1
=
u
ω
+
β
( E[V˜
iT
]+
1
1
−
β
lo
g
β
[1
+
r(
θ i
,T
−1
,
s i
,T
−1
;k˜
i,
T
−1
)]
)
an
d
th
us
V
(θ
i,
T
−1
,
w
i,
T
−1
,
s i
,T
−1
)
=
V˜
i,
T
−1
+
1
1
−
β
lo
g
w
i,
T
−1
(2
6)
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ep
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e
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d
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S
te
p
6:
If
th
e
w
ea
lt
h
sh
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es
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th
e
gu
es
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an
d
th
e
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ar
d
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lc
ul
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h
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es
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ep
5
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e
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e
en
ou
gh
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st
ep
7.
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th
er
w
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e,
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te
yo
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es
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th
e
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ia
l
se
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en
ce
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w
ea
lt
h
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ar
es
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go
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ck
to
st
ep
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S
te
p
7:
In
or
de
r
to
co
m
pu
te
th
e
w
el
fa
re
eff
ec
t
fo
r
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
w
it
h
in
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ia
l
st
at
e
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w
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,
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w
e
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k
th
e
ho
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ol
ds
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e
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e-
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st
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e
ho
w
m
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h
ad
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n
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pe
ri
od
in
or
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r
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n
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ti
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e
re
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rm
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Sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
,l
et
∆
(s
0
)
de
no
te
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
sh
ar
e.
V
(·)
an
d
V
r
ef
(·)
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
de
no
te
th
e
lif
et
im
e
ut
ili
ty
w
it
ho
ut
an
d
w
it
h
la
bo
r
m
ar
ke
t
re
fo
rm
.
T
he
n
1
1
−
β
lo
g(
1
+
∆
(s
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+
V
(θ
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,
w
i0
,
s i
0
)
=
V
r
ef
(θ
i0
,
w
i0
,
s i
0
)
So
lv
in
g
fo
r
∆
yi
el
ds
th
e
w
el
fa
re
eff
ec
t
fo
r
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
w
it
h
cu
rr
en
t
st
at
e
s i
t:
∆
(s
0
)
=
e(
1
−β
)
(V
r
e
f
(θ
i0
,
w
i0
,
s i
0
)−
V
(θ
i0
,
w
i0
,
s i
0
))
N
ot
e
th
at
by
(2
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,
w
e
kn
ow
th
at
w
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el
s
ou
t
su
ch
th
at
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e
w
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e
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en
t
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e
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h
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d
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e
w
ea
lt
h
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F
in
al
ly
,h
av
in
g
ca
lc
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ed
th
e
w
el
fa
re
eff
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ts
∆
(s
0
)
fo
r
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ls
0
,t
he
so
ci
al
w
el
fa
re
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e
w
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gh
te
d
av
er
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e
ov
er
∆
(s
0
)
w
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h
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e
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ar
es
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e
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as
w
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gh
ts
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7
1
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A
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n
a
ti
v
el
y,
w
e
co
u
ld
a
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o
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t
co
m
p
u
te
th
e
so
ci
a
l
w
el
fa
re
a
n
d
a
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er
w
a
rd
s
th
e
w
el
fa
re
eff
ec
ts
.
H
ow
ev
er
,
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n
ce
m
o
st
p
eo
p
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b
el
o
n
g
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o
n
e
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p
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e
em
p
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y
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,
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e
re
su
lt
s
a
re
fa
ir
ly
eq
u
iv
a
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n
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